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Effects of Quantitative Easing on the USA Economy: 
 A Test for Policy Effectiveness 
 
                                                   Abstract 
 
The catastrophic disruption in the USA financial system in the wake of the financial 
crisis prompted the Federal Reserve to launch a Quantitative Easing (QE) programme in 
late 2008. In line with Pesaran and Smith (2014), I use a policy effectiveness test to 
assess whether this massive asset purchase programme was effective in stimulating the 
economic activity in the USA. Specifically, I employ an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
Model (ARDL), in order to obtain a counterfactual for the USA real GDP growth rate. 
Using data from 1983Q1 to 2009Q4, the results show that the beneficial effects of QE 
appear to be weak and rather short-lived. The null hypothesis of policy ineffectiveness 
is not rejected, which suggests that QE did not have a meaningful impact on output 
growth. 
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1    Introduction 
 
The 2008 financial turmoil prompted the Federal Reserve (Fed) to slash the federal 
funds rate to extreme low levels. Deprived of its conventional monetary policy tool, the 
Fed decided to embark on a series of unprecedented monetary policy actions, including 
forward guidance and massive asset purchases, in order to restore stability in financial 
markets and steer the economy. An extensive literature (Baumesteir and Benati (2010), 
Chung et al. (2011), among others) has tried to gauge the extent to which the first round 
of Quantitative Easing (QE1) unveiled in late 2008 promoted the recovery of the USA 
economy. The broad consensus is that the large stimulus package implemented by the 
Fed was successful in avoiding a depression in the USA. 
Several other economies around the world have implemented nonstandard policy 
measures amid concerns that near zero interest rates, the so-called Zero Lower Bound 
(ZLB), would not be sufficient to spark recovery. In this study I pay particular attention 
to the different unconventional monetary policy actions taken by the Fed and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in the wake of the crisis so as to establish possible links 
between the monetary policies of the two central banks.  
The ultimate goal of this study is to further explore the role played by QE1 in the 
recovery of the USA economy by using a policy effectiveness test. In line with Pesaran 
and Smith (2014), I use two Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models (ARDL), one that 
covers the period before the announcement of the large scale asset purchases (1983Q1 – 
2008Q4) and another that takes into account the full sample, from 1983Q1 to 2009Q4. 
A policy intervention is given by a change in at least one of the policy parameters. The 
null hypothesis of the policy effectiveness test is that the intervention is ineffective, that 
is, there is no change in the policy parameters. Moreover, I aim to capture possible 
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indirect effects of the unconventional monetary policy actions implemented in Europe 
on the USA economic activity by including in the model the real output growth rate of 
the Euro Area.  
The main conclusion of the study is that the beneficial effects of QE1 on output growth 
were rather short-lived. This result is corroborated by the policy effectiveness test, 
which indicates that the stimulus programme was ineffective in significantly boosting 
the economic activity. As a result, one can argue that the actual improvement in the real 
GDP growth rate in 2009 might have been due to other policies in place such as the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the unconventional 
monetary policy actions taken by the ECB and the Fed in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, focusing however on the question of QE. Section 3 presents key 
findings in the literature on the effects of large scale asset purchases at the ZLB. Section 
4 discusses the methodology that was used in the empirical analysis.  The results are 
provided in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
2  Actions taken by the ECB and the Fed in the aftermath of 
the crisis  
The unconventional measures taken by the ECB and the Fed in response to the 2008 
financial turmoil were significantly different, though with a common goal of improving 
market functioning. However, it is not appropriate to make a comparison between those 
different responses without taking into account the mandate and the institutional set-up 
surrounding each central bank (Draghi, 2013). The primary mandate of the ECB is to 
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maintain price stability over the medium-long term, whereas that of the Fed 
encompasses not only a price stability goal but also the promotion of maximum 
employment and moderate long term interest rates. Moreover, unlike the Fed, the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits the ECB from purchasing 
government debt in the primary market.  Despite being a controversial issue, secondary-
market purchases of public debt by the ECB may be allowed as long as the main 
objectives of the monetary financing condition are fulfilled, namely safeguarding the 
primary aim of price stability and the independence of the central bank (ECB October 
Bulletin, 2012).  
The intervention of central banks in the bond markets is always a topic of intense 
discussion as some economists believe that it might call into question the reputation, 
and ultimately, the independence of the institution. However, when an interest rate is at 
ZLB and the traditional monetary policy transmission mechanism is impaired, buying 
government bonds might be the only credible solution to avoid persistent deflationary 
pressures (Posen, 2010). Against this background, purchasing government bonds might 
even enhance the credibility of the central bank.  
Lenza et al. (2010) state that the financial structure in which each central bank operates 
as well as the pre-crisis operational framework were two of the most important factors 
behind the different responses of the Fed and the ECB to the crisis. To the extent that 
banks play the predominant role in the provision of credit in Europe, the ECB 
implemented unconventional measures aimed at increasing the liquidity of the banking 
system, one of which was the increase in the maturity of the Eurosystem long-term 
operations. These measures, coupled with a decrease in the short-term interest rate, 
proved effective in ensuring the transmission of monetary policy, namely by 
significantly reducing the interest rate charged on the small-loans to non-financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
6 
 
corporations and households; by expanding  the households´ volume of credit and 
easing  banks´ credit standards (ECB October Bulletin, 2010). In the USA, the Fed 
launched a large-scale asset purchase programme – commonly referred to as 
Quantitative Easing (QE) - with the purpose of tackling the huge disruption in capital 
markets, on which non-financial corporations relied heavily to obtain credit. This 
decision was made based on the conviction that just decreasing the Fed funds rate 
would not be effective in restoring stability. The huge securitization in the American 
financial system has been referred to as one of the reasons for the recent weaker impacts 
of changes in the policy interest rate on the economy (Estrella (2002); Boivin et al., 
(2010)).  
When it comes to the pre-crisis operational framework, the larger size of the 
Eurosystem balance sheet when compared with that of the Fed implied that the demand 
for extra liquidity was proportionally smaller in Europe (Lenza et al. (2010)). 
Furthermore, a very limited set of assets were eligible as collateral by the Fed prior to 
the crisis (mostly US treasury securities) whereas the ECB accepted a broad range of 
assets, from corporate bonds to asset-backed securities. The narrower set of the eligible 
collateral and the nefarious effects of the financial turmoil on the USA capital markets 
prompted the Fed to have a much stronger reaction (in terms of balance sheet) to the 
crisis than that of the ECB (Kohn, 2010). 
In fact, the effects of the financial crisis on the economic activity were particularly acute 
in the USA. A surge in the unemployment rate, the collapse of the Housing and Asset-
backed securities markets, and the tight restrictions on credit pushed down business and 
consumer confidence1. Fischer (2013) argues that the countries where there was a 
turmoil in the financial sector in the aftermath of the crisis were those that suffered a 
                                                          
1 This analysis is based on the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, February 2009 
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stronger economic downturn. The absence of an alarming bubble in the Housing market 
as well as the government support to banks watered down the effects of the catastrophe 
on the European Economy.  
The persistent low levels of inflation across the Eurozone in 2014 pushed the Governing 
Council of the ECB into discussing the possibility of implementing a QE programme 
(Draghi, 2014). The general view was that a prolonged period of extreme low levels of 
inflation could trigger a dangerous process of de-anchoring of inflation expectations, 
which in turn, with the nominal interest rate at the ZLB, could lead to an increase in the 
real interest rate. The fear of lower inflation expectations mainly reflected the slowdown 
in the economic activity of the Euro Area as a whole as well as the sharp downturn in 
the oil market.  
Quantitative Easing has been used by the major central banks in an environment of near 
zero interest rates and gloomy outlook for inflation and economic activity. However, the 
extent to which this massive injection of liquidity causes a rapid and sustainable 
improvement in the economy is a contentious question. One of the traditional channels 
through which QE affects the economic activity is the Portfolio Rebalancing Channel. 
Joyce et al (2012) argues that a purchase of long-term government bonds – which on its 
own tends to push the bonds yields down - tends to reduce the risk premium required by 
investors to allocate their money to other long-term assets2, particularly corporate bonds 
and equities. A growing body of literature, such as D`Amico and King (2010), Gagnon 
et al. (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Jorgenson (2011), has indeed identified a negative 
effect of QE on long term government bonds yields3 (see section 3). Lower yields might 
                                                          
2 This channel relies on the assumption that there is an imperfect substitutability of assets  
3 Schenkelberg, Watzka (2011) state that, despite the broad consensus about the negative effect of QE 
on government bonds yields, investors might require a higher yield in case they perceive that the 
stimulus package will be successful in boosting inflation in the future. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
8 
 
induce governments to issue more debt in an attempt to refinance their liabilities at 
lower interest rates, thereby countering the desired central bank´s change in the relative 
supply of securities.  Thus, the way this channel affects the real economy might hinge 
on a potential coordination between the government´s debt-management policies and 
the central banks´ actions (Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). This aspect is of paramount 
importance when we compare the policies adopted by the ECB and the Fed. While in 
the USA the fiscal implications of QE are possible to be dealt between the Treasury and 
the central bank4, in Europe this coordination is virtually impossible to occur as there is 
no European Treasury, but rather 18 different governments, each of which with its own 
legislation.   
 
3   Empirical evidence of the effects of QE at the ZLB 
3.1 Inflation and Output growth 
A growing literature has tried to assess the effects of asset purchase programmes on the 
real economy when the short-term interest rate is constrained by the ZLB. Though a 
consensus has not been reached yet, there is large evidence that unconventional 
monetary policy was successful in avoiding a repeat of the Great Depression in the USA 
(e.g Baumeister and Benati (2010), Chung et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2012)). Using a 
Bayesian VAR Sign Restrictions approach, Baumeister and Benati (2010) find that in 
the absence of a compression in the yield spread the output growth in the USA would 
have reached a trough of almost minus 10 percent in early 2009 and inflation would 
                                                          
4 Greenwood et al, (2014) provide data showing that the Fed´s attempts to reduce the supply of long-
term bonds in capital markets in 2009 was partly offset by the Treasury´s decision to lengthen the 
average maturity of debt in order to alleviate fiscal risks associated with the rise in the government 
debt´s burden. The authors therefore call for new institutional arrangements aimed at promoting more 
cooperation between the two institutions.  
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have been negative. Chung et al. (2011) conclude that the combination of QE1 and QE2 
boosted the real GDP growth in 3% and inflation in 1% when compared with the 
scenario where the Fed would not have intervened. Based on a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model (DSGE), Chen et al. (2012) find that the second round of QE 
adopted by the Fed expanded output growth by less than one third and inflation barely 
changed relative to what would otherwise have happened in the absence of policy 
intervention. Moreover, they show that the commitment to hold the fed funds rate at the 
ZLB for an extended period of time tends to amplify the responses of inflation and 
economic activity to large scale asset purchases.  
Pesaran and Smith (2014) provide a test for policy effectiveness using reduced form 
policy equations. As an illustrative test, they attempt to gauge the effectiveness of the 
QE programme unveiled in March 2009 in the UK.  Using  an ARDL (1,1) model, they 
conclude that a permanent 100 basis points reduction in the UK government spread has 
an immediate positive impact on the real output growth rate, though it tends to be 
temporary. Nevertheless, after applying a policy effectiveness test, they verify that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, which suggests that the Bank of England´s stimulus plan 
was ineffective.  
3.2 Bond markets  
The Federal Reserve´s decision to embark on a massive purchase of medium-long term 
assets came in two steps. In late November 2008, the Fed announced that it would 
purchase agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and agency debt of up to 600 
billion in order to avoid the collapse of these markets. The Fed decided to further 
expand its balance sheet by announcing in March 2009 that it would purchase long-term 
treasury securities.   



















































































Source : Federal Reserve Bank of ST.Louis (US)
Figure 1 portrays the response of the bond markets to the Fed´s announcement. In line 
with the aforementioned literature, the figure shows that it might have had an immediate 
impact on the long and short term Treasury constant maturity rates (TCMR), 10 year 
and 2 year respectively. One of the ultimate goals of the programme was to lower the 
long term yields as the short term interest rates were already constrained by the ZLB 
(Kohn, (2010)). In fact, the stronger response of the 10 year interest rate led to a decline 
in the spread between the 10 and 2 year yields in the first quarter of 2009. Gagnon et al. 
(2010) conclude indeed that the QE announcement depressed long term yields mainly 
by lowering the term premium rather than by signalling a possible commitment to keep 
interest rates low for an extended period of time.  
Figure 1: Evolution of the bond markets in the aftermath of the crisis 
 
The short-lived decrease in the 10-year Treasury yield suggests that QE1 did not have a 
permanent effect. Gagnon et al. (2010) states that several factors might have been 
behind the slight increase in the long term Treasury yields in 2009, the most important 
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of which were the improvement in the economic outlook and a strong reversal of the 
flight-quality flows that had taken place after the break out of the crisis in 2008.  
The notorious decline in the spread between the Moody Seasoned BAA corporate bond 
yield and 10 year TCMR sheds light on the effects of the expansionary monetary policy 
programme on the private borrowing costs. A decrease in the default and prepayment 
risk premium are considered to be the main channels through which it negatively 
affected BAA corporate bonds and mortgage backed-securities yields (Krishnamurthy 
and Jorgensen, (2011)).   
 
4  Methodology 
In this section I briefly describe the model proposed by Pesaran and Smith5 (2014) that I 
used in order to test for the effectiveness of QE1 in the USA.  
 Pesaran and Smith (2014) propose a macroeconometric rational expectations model and 
they show that the reduced form is given by:  
                                  𝑞𝑡 = Φ (𝜃)𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑥(𝜃)𝑥𝑡 + 𝜓𝑤 (𝜃)𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                           (1) 
where  𝑞𝑡 is a vector that contains the endogenous variables, 𝑦𝑡  (the target variable) and 
𝑧𝑡; 𝑥𝑡 is the policy exogenous variable and 𝑤𝑡 is a non-policy exogenous variable that is 
assumed to be invariant to changes in 𝑥𝑡. 𝜃 is made up of a set of policy parameters, 𝜃𝑝, 
and a set of structural parameters, 𝜃𝑠, that are assumed to be invariant to changes in the 
former. A policy intervention is given by a change in at least one of the policy 
parameters. The null hypothesis of the test is that the policy intervention is ineffective, 
                                                          
5 In this paper I only briefly expose the case of the dynamic model.  Pesaran and Smith (2014) describe a 
model without dynamics as well.  
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that is, there is no evidence of change in  𝜃𝑝 after the intervention. 𝜀𝑡 accounts for 
disturbances in the model. The policy intervention is assumed to occur at the end of 
time t = 𝑇0 and as a result it is possible to have two different samples: one that covers 
the pre-intervention period t = 𝑀,𝑀 + 1,… , 𝑇0 and another that is related to the post-
intervention period t = 𝑇0 + 1, 𝑇0 + 2,… , 𝑇0 + 𝐻. Thus, while the sample size of the 
former is 𝑇 =  𝑇0 − 𝑀 + 1, the latter is equal to 𝐻. 
The impact of the policy intervention on the target variable, 𝑦𝑡 , is given by the 
difference between the realised outcomes,𝑦𝑇0+ℎ, and the counterfactual outcomes, 
𝑦𝑇0+ℎ
0 , during the post-intervention period,  
                             𝑑𝑇0+ℎ = 𝑦𝑇0+ℎ −  𝑦𝑇0+ℎ
0  , ℎ = 1,2,3, … ,𝐻                                    (2) 
These estimated policy effects do not however accurately reflect the actual policy 
impacts as the former will be subject to the post intervention random errors, 𝜀𝑦,𝑇0+ℎ . 
Pesaran and Smith (2014) state that using a fully specified rational expectations 
structural model might not give robust estimates of the counterfactual values once we 
are uncertain about the specification of the complete model. As a result, they believe 
that more accurate estimates of the counterfactual outcomes can be obtained by using 
reduced form policy equations. After excluding the lagged values of 𝑧𝑡, they obtain an 
ARDL model (𝑝𝑦, 𝑝𝑥, 𝑝𝑤) for pre and post-intervention samples : 








′ (𝜃0)𝑤𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜐𝑦𝑡,
𝑝𝑤
𝑘=0  𝑡 = 𝑀,𝑀 +
1,𝑀 + 2,… , 𝑇0                                                                                                              (3) 
𝑦𝑡 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖(𝜃
1)𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜋𝑦𝑥,𝑖(𝜃








+ 𝜐𝑦𝑡,   𝑡 = 𝑇0 +
1, 𝑇0 + 2,… , 𝑇0 +  𝐻                                                                                                     (4) 
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The reason for excluding the variable 𝑧𝑡 is that they aim to attribute to 𝑥𝑡 the possible 
effects that the former might have on the target variable. In other words, they replace 
the variable 𝑧𝑡 with its determinants, which are given by 𝑥𝑡.  
In line with Pesaran and Smith (2014), I set the following lag orders 𝑝𝑦= 𝑝𝑥=1 and 𝑝𝑤= 
0, and rewrite the ARDL specification for the pre-intervention sample as  
                                        𝐲(0) = 𝜆
0𝐲−1,(0) + 𝑺(0)𝜋𝑦𝑠
0 + 𝝂(0)                                  (5) 
where 𝐲(0) = (𝑦𝑀, 𝑦𝑀+1, … , 𝑦𝑇0) ,  𝐲−1,(0) = (𝑦𝑀−1, 𝑦𝑀, … , 𝑦𝑇0−1)′, 𝑺(0) = (𝑿(0), 𝑾(0)) in 
which 𝑿(0) =  (𝒙(0),𝒙−1,(0)), 𝒙(0) = (𝑥𝑀, 𝑥𝑀+1, … , 𝑥𝑇0)′  𝒙−1,(0) = (𝑥𝑀−1, 𝑥𝑀, … , 𝑥𝑇0−1)′,  
and  𝜋𝑦𝑠
0  = ( 𝜋𝑦𝑥0 
0 , 𝜋𝑦𝑥1
0 ,𝜋𝑦𝑤
0′ )′. Finally, 𝝂(0) = (𝜐𝑦,𝑀 , 𝜐𝑦,𝑀+1 , … , 𝜐𝑦,𝑇0 ). 𝑿(0) and 𝑾(0) 
are the 𝑇 × 𝑘𝑥 and 𝑇 × 𝑘𝑤 matrix of observations on the policy variables and the policy 
invariant variables over the pre-intervention sample, respectively.  
Using 𝑿(1)
0 , which is a matrix that includes the counterfactual outcomes of the policy 
variables and their respective lagged values over the period after the intervention, and 
after applying forward iterations of the dynamic equations from 𝑡 =  𝑇0, Pesaran and 
Smith (2014) obtain the following expression for the counterfactual outcome: 
?̂?(1)





0 , ] 




0  ]                                            (6) 
where ?̂?𝐻 










1 0 0 ⋯ 0 0
?̂?0 1 0 ⋯ 0 0
(?̂?0)
2
?̂?0 1 ⋯ 0 0
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𝒆1 = (1,0,…,0)′, ?̂?𝑦𝑠
0  = (?̂?𝑦𝑥
0′ , ?̂?𝑦𝑤
0′ )′ and ?̂?0  are least squares estimates of the parameters 
in the dynamic policy impulse equation covering the pre-intervention sample (3),  
𝜆0, 𝜋𝑦𝑠
0 = (𝜋𝑦𝑥 
0′ , 𝜋𝑦𝑤
0′ )′. 𝑾(1) is the 𝐻 × 𝑘𝑤 matrix of observations on the policy 
invariant variables over the post-intervention period.  
Applying the same forward recursive approach as before, they derive an expression for 





1 + 𝝂(1)] 
                                          = 𝚲𝐻
1 [𝒆1𝜆
1𝑦𝑇0 + 𝑺(1)𝜋𝑦𝑠
1 + 𝝂(1) ].                                     (7) 
Based on the equations (6) and (7) the measured policy effects are therefore given by  
         ?̂?(1) =𝚲𝐻
1 [𝒆1𝜆
1𝑦𝑇0 + 𝑺(1)𝜋𝑦𝑠




0  ] +𝚲𝐻
1 𝝂(1),            (8) 
This expression can be decomposed into three main parts: the systematic effect of the 
policy - changes in the policy parameters due to the policy intervention – that is given 
by 𝜇(1), the random components owing to the post-intervention errors, 𝒗(1), and finally 
the uncertainty regarding the estimation of the parameters 𝜆0 and 𝜋𝑦𝑠 that is reflected 
in 𝜉(1). Thus, the above equation can be written as  
                                              ?̂?(1) =𝜇(1) − 𝜉(1) + 𝚲𝐻
1 𝝂(1),                                          (9) 
where 
                   𝜇(1) = 𝑦𝑇0  (𝚲𝐻 
1 𝜆1 − 𝚲𝐻





0 ⌋ ,               (10) 
                        𝜉(1) = ?̂?𝐻 
0 [𝒆1?̂?
0𝑦𝑇0 + 𝑺(1)?̂?𝑦𝑠
0  ] −  𝚲𝐻 
0 [𝒆1𝜆
0𝑦𝑇0 + 𝑺(1)𝜋𝑦𝑠
0  ]               (11)       
𝚲𝐻
1 𝝂(1) accounts for a vector of random disturbances over the post-intervention period.           
As mentioned above, the null hypothesis of the test for policy effectiveness implies that 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
15 
 
there is an absence of change in the policy parameters after the intervention has taken 
place, which means that the term 𝜇(1) has to be equal to zero. Moreover, Pesaran and 
Smith (2014) state that in the dynamic case it is also necessary to assume that under 𝐻0 
the reaction of the target variable to its lagged value is the same in the pre and post-
intervention period, that is 𝜆1 = 𝜆0, as well as 𝜐𝑦𝑡 is serially uncorrelated with a 
constant variance, given by 𝜎𝜐
2.  
Pesaran and Smith (2014) use a policy mean effect statistic, 
                                                ?̂?𝐻
̅̅̅̅ =  𝐻−1 𝒯𝐻 
′ ?̂?(1),                                                       (12) 
in order to obtain a policy effectiveness test statistic. 𝒯𝐻 
′ is a vector of ones of length 𝐻. 
In their view, this strategy has the advantage of minimizing the importance of the 
aforementioned post-intervention random errors. Thus, they obtained the following test 
statistic  






































)]             (14) 
This test statistic is only valid as long as 𝑇 is reasonably large relative to 𝐻 and 𝝂(1) 
follows a normal distribution.  
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5. Empirical Analysis  
5.1Data  
I use an ARDL model to estimate the effects of QE1 on the USA real output growth 
rate, 𝑦𝑡.  The full sample period (quarterly frequency) is from 1983Q1 to 2009Q4. The 
growth rate is measured by the quarterly change in the logarithm of real GDP. Thus, I 
extracted the quarterly seasonally adjusted series for real GDP from the St.Louis Fed´s 
database.  Following Pesaran and Smith (2014) I use the Euro Area real GDP growth 
rate as a conditioning variable (𝑤𝑡) so as to capture possible indirect effects of the Euro 
Area unconventional monetary policy actions on the USA output growth. This variable 
is extracted from the Global VAR data set and includes eight countries, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The correlation 
between the USA and Euro Area real output growth over the pre-intervention period 
(1983Q1-2008Q4) is 0.37, lower than that observed over the full sample period, 0.47 
(Figure A1 in the appendix). This large gap therefore suggests that the correlation 
between the two growth rates intensified in the wake of the crisis.  
As far as the policy variable is concerned, 𝑥𝑡, I use the quarterly seasonally unadjusted 
spread between the 10 year and 2 Treasury Constant Maturity rate available in the 
St.Louis Fed´s database. A few remarks are however needed to be made regarding this 
choice. Firstly, the fact that the USA is one of the largest, if not the largest economy in 
the world, could indicate that a change in the USA government bonds spread would 
have a meaningful impact on the Euro Area output growth. Given the overwhelming 
importance of the banking system in the dynamics of the European Economy (section 
2), it is unreasonable to assume that such change would have sizeable effects on the 
latter. Such view is corroborated by the correlation between the spread and the Euro 
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Area output growth, -0.47 and -0.46 over the pre-intervention period and full sample, 
respectively. Secondly, the strong dependence of the USA economy on capital markets 
prompted the use of a variable that could somehow reflect the reaction of these markets 
to the large scale asset purchase programme. Gagnon et al. (2010) concluded that the 
10-year term premium decreased between 38 and 82 basis points as a result of the Fed´s 
$1.725 trillion asset purchases. Thus, for illustrative purposes, I regard the 
counterfactual as the effect on the USA real GDP growth rate of there not having been a 
60 basis points reduction - the average of Gagnon et al. (2010) ´s estimates6 - in the 10-
year government bond yield spread for the whole 2009.   
 
5.2 Results 
As the Schwarz criterion indicated one lag, the ARDL model that I consider is given by: 
                           𝑦𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑦𝑥0𝑥𝑡 + 𝜋𝑦𝑥1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑦𝑤𝑤𝑡 + 𝜐𝑦𝑡                     (14) 
I consider two samples, one that covers the pre-intervention period (1983Q1 to 2008Q4) 
and other that ends estimation in 2009Q4. Pesaran and Timmermann (2005) prove that 
when our goal is to minimize out-of-sample mean squared forecast error, it may be 
advantageous to include data before the intervention period to estimate forecasting 
models on data samples that are subject to structural breaks. They state that this 
preposition is only valid as long as some conditions are verified, including the fact that 
the error variances should rise at the point of the structural break and the number of 
observations in the post-intervention period, 𝐻, must be sufficiently low. To the extent 
                                                          
6 Baumeister and Benati (2010) also consider the average of Gagnon et al.´s (2010) time-series estimates 
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that the error variances increased in late 2008 and 𝐻 is equal to 4 - fulfilling in turn the 
two conditions -, I followed the strategy proposed by Pesaran and Timmermann (2005).  
For both sample periods, the equation above passes tests for serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity and normality, but it fails tests for functional form (at 1% level), that 
is, there is evidence that the model is badly specified. The restriction that the long run 
cumulative effect is equal to zero - 𝜋𝑦𝑥0 + 𝜋𝑦𝑥1 =0 – is not rejected (at 5% level) either 
taking into account the pre-intervention sample or the full sample. The fact that the long 
run effect is equal to zero is in line with standard macroeconomic theory that establishes 
a temporary link between the rate of monetary growth and real output growth. Thus, this 
restriction requires the use of the variation of spread, ∆𝑥𝑡, as a regressor in my model.  
Table 1 provides the estimates for the full and the pre-intervention samples, after 
considering the aforementioned restriction 
Table 1: ARDL estimates (t ratios in parentheses)  
 1983Q1-2008Q4 1983Q1 – 2009Q4 
               C 0.003352 0.003424 
 (3.21) (4.17) 
𝑦𝑡−1 0.344443 0.335524 
 (3.43) (3.77) 
Δ𝑥𝑡 -0.483813 -0.459398 
 (-2.24) (-2.23) 
              𝑤𝑡 0.336402 0.346500 
 (3.05) (3.55) 
?̅?2 0.278286 0.356998 
?̂?𝜐 0.005438 0.005365 
 










2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4
y_Realised y_Counterfactual Spread
The full-sample model suggests that a unit change in the variation of 10 year spread 
would have a rather small impact effect, -0.46%. We can equally observe that a unit  
change in the Euro Area output growth tends to increase the USA real GDP growth rate 
by roughly 0.35%. 
Figure 2 examines the effects of a 60 basis points reduction in the spread on the 
predicted real output growth. In other words, the predictions for the counterfactual 
outcomes take into account the spread that would have occurred had the FED not 
engaged in a massive purchase of assets, which in this case would be 60 basis points 
higher. Both predictions – realized and counterfactual outcomes – are obtained from the 
model estimated on the pre-intervention data. Overall, a 60 basis points reduction in the 
spread has a positive temporary impact on the USA real output growth (the fall in 
output growth in the first quarter of 2009 takes less serious proportions), disappearing 
altogether within one year.  
Figure 2: USA output growth forecast using realised and counterfactual spreads 
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As 𝐻 = 4, (2009Q1-2009Q4), ?̂?𝐻
̅̅̅̅  = 0.001091 (12), and from table 1 ?̂?0= 0.344 and 













Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that QE1 was not effective in promoting the 
recovery of the USA economy. Once under the null hypothesis of this test further policy 
changes are assumed to be ineffective ( 𝜆1 = 𝜆0), these results might reflect the well-
known Keynesian’s impotence of monetary policy during a crisis period. Specifically, at 
the same time that the Fed launched a massive asset purchase programme, the Congress 
approved a fiscal stimulus package – American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009 - with the intention of creating jobs and providing help to those most 
hit by the crisis. Thus, if after imposing the restriction that other policies were not 
effective we still draw the conclusion that QE1 did not significantly affect economic 
growth, then these results suggest that the actual boost in the USA real GDP growth rate 
from 2009Q1 to 2009Q4 (Figure A1 in the appendix) might have been mainly due to 
other policies, such as the ARRA. In fact, Feyer and Sacerdote (2011) conclude that 
low-income families incredibly benefited from the fiscal stimulus plan, with Keynesian 
multipliers of over 2. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) discover that the size of the 
fiscal multipliers tends to be substantially higher in recessions than in expansions. 
According to the Keynesian’s monetary impotence, pumping the economy with more 
money might not have immediate expansionary effects as a collapse of expectations and 
confidence, as it was seen after the eruption of the 2008 crisis, can deter individuals 
from investing.   
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5.4 Robustness Check  
As a robustness check, I estimate the above regression (14) using however the lagged 
value of the Euro Area real GDP growth rate7 as a conditioning variable, 𝑤𝑡. This 
change is due to the fact that it might be unreasonable to assume that the improvement 
in the USA output growth did not have a meaningful impact on the economic activity in 
Europe, thereby causing an endogeneity problem in my model. As before, I estimate 
two equations, one that covers the pre-intervention period and other that takes into 
account the full sample. Unlike the previous exercise, 𝑥𝑡 accounts for the 10 year/2 year 
government spread8. 
Table 2: ARDL estimates (t ratios in parentheses) 
 1983Q1-2008Q4 1983Q1 – 2009Q4 
             C 0.002988 0.003017 
               (1.90) (2.31) 
𝑦𝑡−1 0.371045 0.399260 
 (3.56) (4.17) 
𝑥𝑡 -0.506232 -0.418840 




 (-2.52) (2.21) 
             𝑤𝑡−1 0.243325 0.198726 
 (1.71) (1.70) 
                                                          
7 Using an instrument for the conditioning variable is particularly hard in this context as one of the key 
assumptions of the model is that 𝑤𝑡  has to be invariant to changes in the policy variable. For instance, it 
would not be valid to use the terms of trade as an instrument for the Euro Area output growth since a 
change in the government spread would certainly have an impact on the exchange rate which in turn 
would affect the Euro Area output growth.  
 
8 The use of the variation of spread was not possible in this exercise as the real GDP growth rate of the 
Euro Area was not statistically significant.  
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?̅?2 0.226032 0.291892 
?̂?𝜐 0.005631 0.005630 
 
The full-sample model suggests that a unit change in the 10 year government spread 
would not have a strong impact effect, -0.419%.  
Figure A2 (in the appendix) portrays the impact of a 60 basis points reduction in the 
spread on the predicted real GDP growth rate. As before, the positive impact of the 
decline in the spread is rather short-lived.  
Taking into account that 𝐻 = 4, (2009Q1-2009Q4), ?̂?𝐻
̅̅̅̅  = 0.000803 (12), and from table 
2 ?̂?0= 0.371 and ?̂?𝜐=0.005631, the value of the aforementioned policy effectiveness 
statistic (13) is 0.1606. Thus, we conclude again that QE1 did not significantly affect 
real GDP growth in the USA.  
 
5.3 Caveats 
The previous exercise suffers from one potential source of endogeneity, due to a 
simultaneity problem .The policy variable is likely to respond to changes in the target 
variable9. In fact, the sharp contraction in output growth in late 2008 (Figure A1 in the 
appendix) together with the turbulence in financial markets triggered a strong reaction 
from the Fed´s policy makers. Another critical limitation of this exercise is the low 
number of observations after the intervention period. However, as in 2010 a second 
                                                          
9 As far the policy variable is concerned, Pesaran and Smith (2014) suggest expanding the ARDL model 
with a reasonable number of lagged values of the endogenous variable. This strategy however did not 
work out in my model as some of the variables were not statistically significant and it did not pass the 
test for functional form. Moreover, the estimates provided by Gagnon et al.(2010) would no longer be 
applicable in case I decided to use an instrument for the government spread. 
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round of asset purchases was adopted by the Fed, including observations after 2009 
could seriously hamper the link that I was trying to establish between QE1 and the 
recovery of the USA economy. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which the Fed´s first round of QE 
introduced in late 2008 was effective in stimulating the economic activity in the USA. 
Based on the methodology proposed by Pesaran and Smith (2014) I have estimated two 
ARDL models, one that ends estimation in 2008Q4 – before the announcement of the 
programme – and  another that covers the full sample (1983Q1 – 2009Q4). I have used 
an ARDL (1,1) between the real output growth rate and the change in the spread 
between the 10 year and 2 year treasury constant maturity rate, augmented by the  Euro 
Area real output growth. The fact that the real economy in the USA relies heavily on 
credit provided by capital markets triggered the use of the government bonds spread as a 
policy variable. The counterfactual simulations are obtained taking into account the 
average of the estimates of Gagnon et al. (2010) regarding the effects of QE1 on the 10 
year government spread. Specifically, I have assumed that the spread between the long 
and short term interest rate would have been 60 basis points higher in the absence of the 
policy intervention, for the whole 2009.  
The model show that QE1 had an immediate positive impact on output growth, not 
having however lasting effects. The policy effectiveness test supports this conclusion as 
the null hypothesis of ineffectiveness is not rejected. Given the existence of potential 
endogeneity problems in the original model, I have estimated two other equations using 
the lagged value of the Euro Area real GDP growth rate as a conditioning variable. This 
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change does not appear to have had a significant impact on the results since the null 
hypothesis of ineffectiveness keeps being not rejected.  This conclusion suggests that 
other policies might have played a stronger role in the recovery of the USA economy 
such as the large fiscal economic plan, ARRA, approved by the Congress in 2009. 
However, further research is needed to be done in order to accurately evaluate the role 
played by the different policies.  
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